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Abstract
Rideshare platforms, when assigning requests to drivers, tend
to maximize profit for the system and/or minimize waiting
time for riders. Such platforms can exacerbate biases that
drivers may have over certain types of requests. We consider
the case of peak hours when the demand for rides is more
than the supply of drivers. Drivers are well aware of their
advantage during the peak hours and can choose to be se-
lective about which rides to accept. Moreover, if in such a
scenario, the assignment of requests to drivers (by the plat-
form) is made only to maximize profit and/or minimize wait
time for riders, requests of a certain type (e.g., from a non-
popular pickup location, or to a non-popular drop-off loca-
tion) might never be assigned to a driver. Such a system can
be highly unfair to riders. However, increasing fairness might
come at a cost of the overall profit made by the rideshare
platform. To balance these conflicting goals, we present a
flexible, non-adaptive algorithm, NAdap, that allows the plat-
form designer to control the profit and fairness of the system
via parameters α and β respectively. We model the match-
ing problem as an online bipartite matching where the set
of drivers is offline and requests arrive online. Upon the ar-
rival of a request, we use NAdap to assign it to a driver
(the driver might then choose to accept or reject it) or re-
ject the request. We formalize the measures of profit and fair-
ness in our setting and show that by using NAdap, the com-
petitive ratios for profit and fairness measures would be no
worse than α/e and β/e respectively. Extensive experimen-
tal results on both real-world and synthetic datasets confirm
the validity of our theoretical lower bounds. Additionally,
they show that NAdap under some choice of (α, β) can beat
two natural heuristics, Greedy and Uniform, on both fairness
and profit. Code is available at: https://github.com/
nvedant07/rideshare-fairness-peak/.
1 Introduction
Rideshare platforms have received significant attention in
both the computer science and operations research com-
munities. The following are the three main categories of
research. The first studies matching policy design in the
rideshare setting (i.e., matching riders and drivers), e.g.,
Copyright © 2020, Association for the Advancement of Artificial
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(Zhao et al. 2019; Ashlagi et al. 2019; Lowalekar, Varakan-
tham, and Jaillet 2018; Tong et al. 2016b; Tong et al. 2016a;
Tong et al. 2017; Bei and Zhang 2018; Dickerson et al.
2018b; Dickerson et al. 2018a). The second considers the
spatial-temporal pricing aspects of rideshare, e.g., (Ma,
Fang, and Parkes 2019; Bimpikis, Candogan, and Saban
2017; Kanoria and Qian 2019; Banerjee, Freund, and Lyk-
ouris 2017; Banerjee, Johari, and Riquelme 2016). The third
focuses on applying reinforcement-learning approaches to
planning and matching problems in rideshare see, e.g., (Xu
et al. 2018; Lin et al. 2018).
In all the aforementioned prior work, the objective is ei-
ther to maximize the total profit of the system or minimize
the waiting time of riders (or a combination thereof). How-
ever, both of these objectives are global in that they do not
ensure sub-group level fairness (e.g., riders of a particular
protected class being systematically underserved). Consider
a scenario during peak hours when there is increased de-
mand for rides, thus, giving the drivers a bargaining advan-
tage to drop rides. Typical criteria used by drivers to reject
riders include riders’ starting/ending location, trip length,
gender, race and age. Recently, it has been reported that
drivers also reject riders based on attributes such as gen-
der, race and disability either intentionally or unintention-
ally, see, e.g., (Laurence 2019; Cook 2019; Griffin 2019).
Houser (2018) reported that “black passengers using ride-
hailing apps have to wait an average of 1 minute and 43 sec-
onds longer than white counterparts and are 4% more likely
to have drivers cancel on them.”
Thus, current rideshare platforms can enable and am-
plify prejudices in society. To counter this, current rideshare
apps implement the following measures:1 (1) Riders’ photo
and destination are hidden from the driver until they ac-
cept/reject the request; (2) Penalty is imposed if drivers
cancel a certain number of trips after initially accepting
them (e.g., drivers’ account getting temporarily deactivated).
However, drivers devise new strategies to avoid the restric-
tions imposed by the above measures. It was reported (Paul
2018) that some Uber drivers bypass the limitation imposed
by (1) by starting the trip moments before picking up a pas-
1See, for example, §4A “Sharing Between Users” in Lyft’s pri-
vacy policy found at https://www.lyft.com/privacy.
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senger to see where the passenger is going. In some other
cases, drivers get around the limitation imposed by (2) by
intentionally delaying the pickup, thus forcing the rider to
cancel the trip instead.
Ensuring group level fairness and optimizing global profit
tends to be somewhat conflicting goals in general; particu-
larly so in rideshare platforms during peak hours. The ra-
tionale is that the driver to request ratio is small and thus,
drivers can afford to be more choosy. This may lead to un-
fair practices such as rejecting trips to unpopular destina-
tions and rejecting riders with disabilities. To promote group
level fairness among the riders, systems should aggressively
match requests which typically incur high cancellation rates.
This action, however, would increase the number of cancel-
lations by drivers. The current penalty in popular rideshare
platforms is that drivers are deactivated if they cancel too
many requests. Thus, prioritizing high risk (in terms of can-
cellation) trips could lead to more drivers being deactivated
and/or leaving the system. In summary, on one hand, priori-
tizing group level fairness leads to limited drivers and thus,
limited total trips. On the other hand, letting the market find
its equilibrium leads to amplifying societal biases. Thus, the
central question is the following: Can we design policies
that can smoothly tradeoff between the two conflicting ob-
jectives?
In this paper, we answer the above question in the affir-
mative by providing provably efficient policies. As is com-
mon (see, e.g., Dickerson et al. (2018a) for additional mo-
tivation) we model the dynamics of the rideshare platform
as an online-matching model as follows. We have a bipar-
tite graph G = (U,V, E), where U and V represent the set of
available drivers (static or offline) and the request types (dy-
namic or online arrival) respectively.2 We use the notation
m := |U | and n := |V | throughout this paper. Each driver
type represents a specific group (e.g., gender, age and race)
in a given location, while each request type represents a spe-
cific group with a given starting and ending location. There
is an edge f = (u, v) if u is capable of serving the request
(of type) v (i.e., the distance between them is below a given
threshold). The online phase consists of T time-steps with
the sets U and V known to the algorithm. In each time-step,
a request v ∈ V arrives and is presented to the algorithm.
Upon its arrival an immediate and irrevocable decision is re-
quired: either reject v, or match v with an available driver in
U. WLOG we assume that each u has a unit capacity (which
can be matched only once).3
We have the following key assumptions that we use to
show provably guarantees. In the experimental section, we
work with real data and show that the algorithms are robust
even when some of these assumptions do not necessarily
hold.
2We consider a small time window during the peak hours, thus
assuming that the set of drivers are static.
3We can create multiple copies of u to address the case when
each u can be matched multiple times. Note that each copy corre-
sponds to the same driver and shares same underlying variables.
Arrival of Requests. We consider a finite set of T re-
quests v ∈ V that are drawn from a known identical dis-
tribution independently; this is commonly (Dickerson et al.
2018a) called the known identical independent distributions
(KIID). The motivation for this assumption stems from the
fact that we can often learn the arrival distribution from his-
torical logs (Yao et al. 2018; Li et al. 2018; Wang, Fu, and
Ye 2018). KIID is widely used in many practical applica-
tions of online matching markets including rideshare and
crowdsourcing (Zhao et al. 2019; Dickerson et al. 2018b;
Singer and Mittal 2013; Singla and Krause 2013). Further,
we call the expected number of times any request v is sam-
pled from this distribution in the T rounds as the arrival rate,
denoted by rv . Thus, it is easy to see that
∑
v∈V rv = T . We
further assume that the total number of arrivals of online re-
quests is far larger than that of drivers in the system, i.e.,
T  |U |.
Edge existence probabilities. Each edge f = (u, v) is as-
sociated with an existence probability p f ∈ (0, 1]: once we
assign v to u, we observe an immediate random outcome of
the existence, which is present (i.e., u accepts v) with proba-
bility p f and not (u cancels v) otherwise. The probability p f
captures the statistical chance that a driver of type u would
accept to serve the request of type v. We assume that (1) the
randomness driving the edge existence is independent across
all the edges; (2) the values p f are provided as part of the in-
put. The first assumption is motivated by individual choice
and the second from the fact that historical logs can be used
to compute such statistics with high precision.
Cancellation budget. Each driver u is associated with a
given budget of cancellation, ∆u ∈ Z+. In other words, driver
u ∈ U will be removed from the graph G if they cancel more
than ∆u requests in the T rounds (in which case we assume
that u is temporarily deactivated by the system as a penalty).
Once a request v gets rejected, we assume that the system
will not try any reassignment of v to other available drivers.
This is without loss of generality since any reassignment can
be modeled as resampling in the succeeding time-steps.
We assume that the system gains a profit w f from f =
(u, v) if driver u completes (i.e., is assigned and the driver
accepts) the trip v (in this case, we call it a successful as-
signment or a match). For a given policy ALG, letM (pos-
sibly random) be the set of successful assignments; we inter-
changeably use the term matching to denote this setM. We
define two objectives, namely profit and fairness, as follows.
Profit: The expected total profit over all matches, which is
defined as E[∑e∈M we].
Fairness: Let Mv ⊆ M be the subset of edges incident
to v. Note that |Mv | can be larger than 1 due to mul-
tiple arrivals of type v in the T time-steps. We define
the fairness achieved by ALG over all request types as
minv∈V E[ |Mv |]rv , which refers to the minimum ratio of
the expected number of matches of type v to that of ar-
rivals.4 Thus, maximizing fairness corresponds to maxi-
4Since we are in the context of peak hours, we consider the
mizing this minimum ratio.
We aim to design an online matching policy that balances
the tradeoff between the two objectives of maximizing profit
and fairness.
1.1 Preliminaries and Main Contributions
Competitive ratio. Competitive ratio is a commonly-used
metric to evaluate the performance of online algorithms.
Consider an online maximization problem for example. Let
ALG(I) = EI∼I[ALG(I)] denote the expected perfor-
mance of ALG on a given distribution I, where the ex-
pectation is taken over the random arrival sequence I. Let
OPT(I) = E[OPT(I)] denote the expected offline optimal,
where OPT(I) refers to the optimal value after we observe
the full arrival sequence I. Then, the competitive ratio is
defined as minI ALG(I)OPT(I) . It is a common technique to use
a Linear Program (LP) to upper bound OPT(I) (called the
benchmark LP) and hence get a valid lower bound on the tar-
get competitive ratio. In our paper, we conduct competitive-
ratio analysis on both objectives.
Main contributions. This paper provides three-fold contri-
butions.
First, we formalize the metric of fairness in rideshare.
More specifically, we consider the online-matching based
model with multiple objectives.
Second, we present a provably efficient algorithm and
provide formal mathematical guarantees. To do so, we first
propose a bi-objective linear program (LP-(1) and LP-(2)),
whose optimal value is at least as large as that of any on-
line algorithm that maximizes either of these objectives (or
a combination thereof). Our main algorithm NAdap uses this
bi-objective LP to guide the online decision-making process.
In particular, we prove the following main theorems.
Theorem 1. NAdap(α, β) achieves a competitive ratio at
least
(
α/e, β/e
)
simultaneously on the profit and fairness
for any given α, β > 0 with α + β ≤ 1.
Theorem 2. No non-adaptive algorithm can achieve a
(α, β)-competitive ratio simultaneously on the profit and
fairness with α + β > 1 − 1/e using LP-(1) and LP-(2) as
the benchmark.
Third, we provide an extensive evaluation of the algorithm
and modeling assumption on a real-world dataset collected
from a large on-demand taxi dispatching platform. The ex-
periments have many novel insights; among others, we show
that even when some of the assumptions that were used to
prove mathematical guarantees do not hold, NAdap performs
well in practice.
group level fairness of riders.
2 Additional Related Work
There is a large body of work which studies fairness is-
sues in resource allocation problems (divisible or indivisible
goods), see, e.g., (Ghodsi et al. 2011; Bateni et al. 2016;
Parkes, Procaccia, and Shah 2015; Kash, Procaccia, and
Shah 2014; Fain, Munagala, and Shah 2018). Most of these
works require the allocation policy to satisfy certain proper-
ties in fair mechanism design such as strategy-proofness and
envy-freeness. These properties do not apply here, however.
Recent work by Sühr et al. (2019) proposes a matching pol-
icy to balance fairness and profit over time; however, they
do not provide any optimality guarantess for their proposed
policy. Lesmana, Zhang, and Bei (2019) has a setting sim-
ilar to ours, however they consider the case when there are
more drivers than riders. Our focus is on the case when the
number of drivers in the system are less than the demand for
rides (i.e., peak hours).
Our model belongs to a more general optimization
paradigm, called Multi-Objective Optimization. Ravi et al.
(1993) presented approximation algorithms for a variety of
network-design problems. Grandoni, Ravi, and Singh (2009)
designed several iterative-rounding based approximation al-
gorithms for multi-objective optimization problems. More
recently, Aggarwal et al. (2014) studies the Bi-objective On-
line Bipartite Matching where there is essentially one single
objective: the minimum matching ratio over two disjoint sets
of edges. Esfandiari, Korula, and Mirrokni (2016) consid-
ers the Bi-objective Online Submodular Optimization prob-
lem, where the two objectives are two monotone submodular
functions. Our objectives are two linear functions, but our
model assumes a more complicated setting (i.e., edge ex-
istence probabilities and cancellation quotas on the offline-
side vertices). The models studied by Bansal et al. (2012)
and Brubach et al. (2017) have the closest setting to us: each
edge has an independent existence probability and each ver-
tex from the offline and/or online side has a patience con-
straint (similar to cancellation quota for each driver in our
setting) on it. However, both those works investigated only
one single objective: maximization of the total profit.
3 Valid Benchmarks for Profit and Fairness
We first present our benchmark LPs and then an LP-based
parameterized algorithm. For each edge f = (u, v), let x f be
the expected number of probes on edge f (i.e., assignments
of v to u but not necessarily matches) in the offline optimal.
For each u (v), let Eu (Ev) be the set of neighboring edges
incident to u (v). Consider the following bi-objective LP.
max
∑
f
w f x f p f (1)
maxmin
v∈V
∑
f ∈Ev x f p f
rv
(2)
s.t.
∑
f ∈Eu
x f p f ≤ 1 ∀u ∈ U (3)∑
f ∈Eu
x f ≤ ∆u ∀u ∈ U (4)∑
f ∈Ev
x f ≤ rv ∀v ∈ V (5)
0 ≤ x f ∀ f ∈ E (6)
Let LP-(1) and LP-(2) denote the two LPs with the re-
spective Objective (1) and (2), each with constraints (3),
(4), (5), (6). Note that we can rewrite Objective (2) as a
linear one like max η with additional linear constraints as
η ≤
∑
f ∈Ev x f p f
rv
for all v ∈ V . For presentation convenience,
we keep the current compact version. The validity of LP-(1)
and LP-(2) as benchmarks for our two objectives can be seen
in the following lemma.
Lemma 1. LP-(1) and LP-(2) are valid benchmarks for the
two respective objectives, profit and fairness. In other words,
the optimal values to LP-(1) and LP-(2) are valid upper
bounds for the expected profit and fairness achieved by the
offline optimal respectively.
Proof. We can verify that objective functions (1) and (2)
each captures the exact expected profit and fairness achieved
by the offline optimal, according to our definition in Sec-
tion 1. To prove the validity of the benchmark for each ob-
jective, it suffices to show the feasibility of all constraints
for any given offline optimal.
Constraint (3) is valid since each driver u has a unit ca-
pacity; Constraint (4) is valid since each u can be probed
at most ∆u times according to our assumption; Constraint
(5) is valid since the expected number of probes related to
each v should be no more than that of online arrivals (recall
that we can try at most one assignment upon the arrival of
v). Thus we justify the feasibility of all constraints for any
given offline optimal. 
4 An LP-based Parameterized Algorithm
Now we present an LP-based parameterized algorithm. Let
{x∗f } and {y∗f } be an optimal solution to LP-(1) and LP-(2)
respectively. Consider a given pair of parameters (α, β) with
0 ≤ α, β ≤ 1, α + β ≤ 1. NAdap(α, β) will sample an as-
signment guided by the two LP solutions {x∗f } and {y∗f },
with probabilities p and q respectively. Note that constraint
(4) for the LP models the expectation of number of probes.
While this number might exceed ∆u , it’s important to note
that this solution is for the offline case and does not corre-
spond to the actual assignments. During the execution of our
algorithm, we explicitly check if a driver is available before
making the assignment, thus ensuring that no driver is as-
signed more than ∆u rides. The details are as follows.
Algorithm 1: An LP-based non-adaptive algorithm:
NAdap(α, β)
1 Let v arrive at time t.
2 With probability α, sample an edge (assignment)
f = (u, v) ∈ Evwith probability x∗f /rv . Assign v to u
iff u is available at t.
3 With probability β, sample an edge (assignment)
f ′ = (u′, v) ∈ Evwith probability y∗f /rv . Assign v to
u′ iff u′ is available at t.
4 With probability 1 − α − β, reject v.
The key part to prove Theorem 1 is the computation of the
probability that each driver is available at each time. Focus
on a given driver u and a time t ∈ [T]. Let SFu,t be the event
that u is available at (the beginning of) t. Note that the occur-
rence of SFu,t can be guaranteed by these two events: (1) u
never received and simultaneously accepted any assignment
prior to t; (2) u received no more than ∆u − 1 assignments
prior to t. For each f = (u, v) ∈ Eu and ` < t, let Xf ,` indi-
cate if f comes (or v comes) at time `, Yf ,t indicate if f gets
sampled in NAdap(p, q) at t and Z f ,t indicate if u accepts
f after the assignment. Set Au,t 
∑
`<t
∑
f ∈Eu Xf ,`Yf ,`Z f ,`
and Bu,t 
∑
`<t
∑
f ∈Eu Xf ,`Yf ,` . From our analysis, we see
that Pr[SFu,t ] ≥ Pr[(Au,t = 0) ∧ (Bu,t ≤ ∆u − 1)].
Lemma 2. For any given u and t ∈ [T], we have
Pr[Au,t = 0] ≥
(
1 − 1
T
) t−1
, Pr[Bu,t ≤ ∆u − 1] ≥ 1 − t − 1T
Proof.
Pr[Au,t = 0] =
∏`
<t
Pr
[ ∑
f ∈Eu
Xf ,`Yf ,`Z f ,` = 0
]
=
∏`
<t
©­«1 − Pr
[ ∑
f ∈Eu
Xf ,`Yf ,`Z f ,` ≥ 1
]ª®¬
=
∏`
<t
©­«1 −
∑
f ∈Eu
rv
T
(
α
x∗f
rv
+ β
y∗f
rv
)
p f
ª®¬
=
∏`
<t
©­«1 − 1T
∑
f ∈Eu
(
αx∗f p f + βy
∗
f p f
)ª®¬
≥
(
1 − 1
T
) t−1
The last inequality follows from
∑
f ∈Eu x
∗
f p f ≤ 1 and∑
f ∈Eu y
∗
f p f ≤ 1 due to Constraint (3), and α + β ≤ 1.
As for the second inequality, we have
Pr[Bu,t ≤ ∆u − 1] = 1 − Pr[Bu,t ≥ ∆u] ≥ 1 − 1
∆u
E[Bu,t ]
(7)
Note that
E[Bu,t ] =
∑`
<t
∑
f ∈Eu
E[Xf ,`Yf ,`] =
∑`
<t
∑
f ∈Eu
rv
T
(αx∗f
rv
+
βy∗f
rv
)
(8)
≤ 1
T
∑`
<t
(α + β)∆u ≤ t − 1T ∆u (9)
The last inequalities above follows from
∑
f ∈Eu x
∗
f ≤ ∆u
and
∑
f ∈Eu y f ≤ ∆u due to Constraint (4), and α + β ≤ 1.
Substituting Inequality (9) to (7), we have that Pr[Bu,t ≤
∆u − 1] ≥ 1 − (t − 1)/T . 
Lemma 3.
Pr[Bu,t ≤ ∆u − 1|Au,t = 0] ≥ 1 − t − 1T
Lemma 3 says that the two events (Au,t = 0) and (Bu,t ≤
∆u − 1) are positively correlated. Proof of Lemma 3 can be
found in the full version of the paper (on Arxiv).
Now we have all ingredients to prove the main Theorem 1.
Proof. From Lemmas 2 and 3, we have for each u and t ∈
[T],
Pr[SFu,t ] ≥ Pr[(Au,t = 0) ∧ (Bu,t ≤ ∆u − 1)]
≥ Pr[Au,t = 0]Pr[Bu,t ≤ ∆u − 1] ≥
(
1 − 1
T
) t−1 (
1 − t − 1
T
)
For each f ∈ E , let κ f be the expected number of success-
ful assignments of f in NAdap(α, β). Here an assignment
f = (v, u) is successful iff u is available when we assign v to
u (but no necessarily means u accepts v).
κ f =
T∑
t=1
rv
T
Pr[SFu,t ]
(αx∗f
rv
+
βy∗f
rv
)
≥
T∑
t=1
1
T
(
1 − 1
T
) t−1 (
1 − t − 1
T
) (
αx∗f + βy
∗
f
)
∼
αx∗f + βy
∗
f
e
The last term is obtained after taking T →∞.
Let Profit(α, β) be the expected total profit obtained
by NAdap(α, β). By linearity of expectation, we have
Profit(α, β) ≥ ∑ f ∈E 1e (αx∗f + βy∗f )pewe. From Lemma 1,
we know that the expected profit in offline optimal is upper
bounded by
∑
f ∈E x∗f pewe. Thus we claim that NAdap(α, β)
achieves a ratio at least α/e on the profit. Similarly, we can
argue that NAdap(α, β) achieves a ratio at least β/e on the
fairness. 
5 Hardness Results
The model in our paper has two objectives which complicate
the hardness analysis. To simplify it, we focus only on those
non-adaptive algorithms. We characterize a non-adaptive al-
gorithm as ®z = {z f | f ∈ E f } where each z f ∈ [0, 1]Nv
(Nv is the size of Ev , the set of edges incident to v) such
that
∑
f ∈Ev z f ≤ 1. A non-adaptive algorithm parameterized
with ®z, denoted by NADAP(®z) will sample an assignment
f = (u, v) ∈ Ev with probability z f upon the arrival of v, and
assign v to u if u is available. Note that our LP-based param-
eterized algorithm NAdap(α, β) can be viewed as a specific
non-adaptive with z f = αx∗f /rv + βy∗f /rv for each f .
Example 1. Consider a star graph where U = {u} with
∆u = 1, V = {v0, v1, . . . , vK } and T = K + 1. We use j to
denote vj and edge fj = (u, vj) when the context is clear. Let
wj = 1 and rj = 1 for all j = 0, 1, . . . ,K . In other words,
our star graph is unweighted and the arrival distributions
are uniform. Set pj = 1 for j = 0 and pj =  for each
j ∈ [K]. Let OPT-P and OPT-F denote the optimal LP values
of LP-(1) and LP-(2) on this example respectively. We can
verify that: (1) OPT-P = 1, where there is a unique optimal
solution x0 = 1 and xj = 0 for all j ∈ [K]; (2) OPT-F =

K+ , where there is a unique optimal solution x0 =

+K and
xj = 1+K for all j ∈ [K].
Consider a given non-adaptive algorithm NADAP(®z) ,
with ®z = {z0, z1, . . . , zK } on the above example. Let P(®z)
and F(®z) be the expected total profit and fairness achieved
by NADAP(®z). Set z = ∑Kj=0 zj . Note that 0 ≤ z ≤ 1.
Lemma 4. The sum of competitive ratios achieved by
NADAP(®z) for the profit and fairness on Example 1 is no
larger than 1 − 1/e + 2 .
Proof.
P(®z) = z0
T
T∑
t=1
(
1 −
∑K
j=0 zj
T
) t−1
+
K∑
j=1
zj
T
T∑
t=1
(
1 −
∑K
j=0 zj
T
) t−1
=
z0
z
(
1 − exp(−z)
)
+
(∑Kj=1 zj)
z
(
1 − exp(−z)
)
(T →∞)
≤ z0
z
(
1 − exp(−z)
)
+ 
From the above computation, we see that the expected
sum of acceptances of assignments over all j ∈ [K] during
the online phase is
(∑Kj=1 z j )
z
(
1 − exp(−z)
)
. Thus the mini-
mum ratio should be no larger than the average, from which
we have
F(®z) ≤
(∑Kj=1 zj)
zK
(
1 − exp(−z)
)
Note that OPT-P = 1 and OPT-F = K+ . Thus the sum of
competitive ratios on the profit and fairness should be
P(®z)
OPT-P
+
F(®z)
OPT-F
≤ z0
z
(
1 − exp(−z)
)
+  +
(∑Kj=1 zj)
z
K + 
K
(
1 − exp(−z)
)
≤ 1 − exp(−z) + 2 ≤ 1 − 1/e + 2

Notice that Lemma 4 immediately implies our main The-
orem 2.
6 Experiments
Real-world dataset processing. We now provide experi-
mental validation of our algorithms. We use a real-world
dataset: the New York City yellow cabs dataset5,6 which
contains taxi trip records from Manhattan, Brooklyn, and
Queens during the year 2013. The dataset is split into 12
months. For each month we have a the record of a completed
trip that contains an anonymized hash of a driver’s license,
the start and end location of the trip (latitude and longitude),
time and date when the trip was initiated and ended, time
taken to complete the trip, distance of the trip (in miles)
and additional attributes such as number of passengers and
registration number. Demographics of the drivers and riders
are not known; however, to demonstrate our methodology,
we randomly assign a “disadvantaged” or “advantaged” race
status to all requesters such that ratio of disadvantaged rid-
ers to advantaged riders is 1:2, which roughly matches the
racial demographics of the city.7 For drivers, we randomly
assign race such that the ratio of disadvantaged to advan-
taged drivers is 3:1.8,9 For the purpose of demonstration, we
consider race to be binary; however, in reality, there would
be many other races, which our model can easily incorpo-
rate, given that the distribution of p f is known or can be
learned.
We consider the rush hour of 7–8PM; in our dataset, this
period typically has the largest number of trips per hour of
the day. On Jan. 31st 2013, a total of 35,109 trips were com-
pleted by a total of 10,814 drivers. One driver might make
multiple trips during this period. However, here we assume
that once a driver starts the trip, they are out of the system.
So, we assume that all 10,814 drivers are present at the start
and need to serve a total of 35,109 trips (i.e., T = 35,109).
This is consistent with peak hour assumptions (T  |U |).
Similar to Dickerson et al. (2018a), we focus on longitudes
from −73◦ to −75◦ and latitudes from 40.4◦ to 40.95◦, both
with a step size of 0.05. We then assign an index to each
grid and every location with latitudes and/or longitude in a
particular grid is represented by the index of that grid.
We construct our graph G = (U,V, E) as follows. Each
u ∈ U represents a driver type which has attributes of the
starting location and race. Each v ∈ V represents a request
type which has attributes of the starting location, ending lo-
cation, and race. We downsample from all driver and request
types such that |U | = 48 and |V | = 24. For each u, we set a
uniform cancellation quota ∆; across three experiments, we
vary ∆ ∈ {1, 2, 3}. For each v, we generate a random value
rv ∼ N(15, 1) (normal distribution) and assign the value as
5http://www.andresmh.com/nyctaxitrips/
6https://tinyurl.com/y56gonvs
7https://tinyurl.com/y7q8dppr
8https://tinyurl.com/y27anseh
9For simplicity, we ignore other potential discrimination fac-
tors such as gender and disability.
its arrival rate. Set T =
∑
v∈V rv . We assume that the driver’s
starting coordinates belong to the same bin as that of the start
coordinates of the trip. An edge exists between a driver type
u and a request type v, iff the starting coordinates of v is in
the same bin as that of u. We set the existing probabilities
mainly based on the combination of driver and rider’s races.
When both driver and rider belong to the advantaged class,
we assign p f = 0.6; if driver and rider are both members of
the disadvantaged class then we assign p f = 0.3 and in all
other cases p f = 0.1. These probabilities are then scaled up
by a factor κ, i.e., p f = κ + (1 − κ) · p f . In our experiments
we set κ = 0.5. The profit associated with each edge (w f ) is
defined as the normalized distance of the request type v (so
0 ≤ w f ≤ 1).
Synthetic dataset. To generate a synthetic dataset, we fix
|U | = 100, |V | = 50,T = 700, and sample arrival rates ran-
domly from a multinomial distribution to ensure they sum up
to T(= 700). Between each pair u ∈ U and v ∈ V , an edge
exists with probability 0.1 and does not exist with probabil-
ity 0.9. The probabilities p f are randomly sampled such that
p f ∈ [0.5, 1] and the profit values (w f ) associated with each
edge are randomly sampled such that w f ∈ [0, 1]. We assign
each u the same cancellation quota ∆, and vary ∆ ∈ {1, 2, 3}
across three experiments.
Algorithms. We run NAdap for 5000 iterations and take the
average values over these runs to be the expectations. We use
profit computed via LP-(1) as the benchmark and use it to
calculate the competitive ratio of profit for NAdap. Similarly,
we use LP-(2) as the benchmark for fairness and use it to
calculate the competitive ratio of fairness for NAdap. For
Greedy and Uniform, say a request of type v arrives at time
t and let Ev,t be the set of available assignments at t and let
Ev be all possible assignments for v. In Uniform, we sample
an assignment uniformly from Ev and check if it exists in
Ev,t . If it exists, then we make the assignment; otherwise,
we reject the request. In Greedy, we select the assignment
with the highest p f value among Ev,t .
Results on the real and synthetic datasets. Figures 1 and 2
show results on the real dataset. We see that the solid lines
(performance of NAdap) always stay above the dotted ones
(theoretical lower bounds). Note that a higher β means that
NAdap is guided more heavily by ®y∗ and a higher α means
NAdap is guided more heavily by ®x∗. For the cases when
this trend is not apparent (e.g., for ∆ = 3 in Figure 1), we
posit that the optimal solutions (®x∗ and ®y∗) are highly corre-
lated. Figure 2 shows that the effectiveness and flexibility of
NAdap on both objectives compared to Greedy and Uniform.
Specifically, Greedy is very weak and dominated by almost
all variants of NAdap on both objectives. This is expected
since Greedy as a heuristic is short-sighted and does not
make assignments based on the what kind of requests the
system expects to get in the future.Uniform seems to achieve
relatively high fairness, which makes sense due to the nature
of Uniform. However, NAdap provides a wide range of op-
tions and some of them can beat Uniform on both objectives
as well. Figures 3 and 4 show results on the synthetic dataset.
The trends are more consistent since all values here are ran-
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Figure 1: Real dataset: competitive ratios for profit and fairness with different values of α and β with α+ β = 1. |U | = 48, |V | =
24,T = 359. ∆ = 1 (Left), ∆ = 2 (Middle), and ∆ = 3 (Right).
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Figure 2: Real dataset: comparison of performances of NAdap against Greedy and Uniform. |U | = 48, |V | = 24,T = 359. ∆ = 1
(Left), ∆ = 2 (Middle), and ∆ = 3 (Right).
domly picked. We see that even in this case NAdap is able to
do better than Greedy and Uniform on both the objectives.
7 Conclusion
In this work, we present a flexible approach for matching re-
quests to drivers during peak hours that balances fairness and
profit. Our proposed approach allows the system designer
to specify how fair and how profitable they want the sys-
tem to be via two separate parameters. We take a nuanced
view of the ridesharing market and model the problem as an
online bipartite matching problem with stochastic rewards.
One highlight is the introduction of existence probability on
each edge, which captures the potential acceptance rate for
each pair of driver and rider types. We present an LP-based
algorithm that dynamically assigns requests to drivers. Ex-
tensive experimental results on both of the real and synthetic
datasets show that our proposed approach is not only above
the theoretical lower bounds but also can beat natural ap-
proaches such as Greedy and Uniform on both objectives.
Our work presents many interesting directions for future re-
search. For example, we propose a non-adaptive algorithm
in which once a request is rejected (either by the system or
the driver), it will not be assigned again. A possible direc-
tion for future work could be to re-assign a rejected request.
Finally, we assume that drivers do not appear again in the
system for the peak hour, however, in reality, that might not
always be the case. We hope that our work will encourage
the community to look at such problems.
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9 Proof of Lemma 3
Lemma 3
Pr[Bu,t ≤ ∆u − 1|Au,t = 0] ≥ 1 − t − 1T
Proof. Consider a given f ∈ Eu and ` < t.
E[Xf ,`Yf ,` |Au,t = 0] = E[Xf ,`Yf ,` |Au,` = 0]
=
Pr[Xf ,` = Yf ,` = 1, Z f ,` = 0]
Pr[Au,` = 0]
=
(rv/T)(αx∗f /rv + βy∗f /rv)(1 − p f )
1 −∑ f ∈Eu (rv/T)(αx∗f /rv + βy∗f /rv)p f
=
(rv/T)(αx∗f /rv + βy∗f /rv)(1 − p f )
1 − p f + p f
(
1 −∑ f ∈Eu (1/T)(αx∗f + βy∗f ))
≤ (rv/T)(αx∗f /rv + βy∗f /rv) = E[Xf ,`Yf ,`]
The last inequality follows from the fact that∑
f ∈Eu (1/T)(αx∗f + βy∗f ) ≤ ∆u/T < 1 according to
our assumption. The above analysis implies that conditional
expectation of each term Xf ,`Yf ,` over (Au,t = 0) is no more
than the unconditional expectation. By applying a similar
analysis in the second part of proof in Lemma 2, we get our
claim. 
10 Peak Hour
Based on the empirical distribution of the number of com-
pleted trips by hour of the day (Figure 6) for January 2013,
we see that 7PM - 8PM (19:00 - 20:00 hrs) has the maxi-
mum number of completed trips. Thus, we use this hour as
the peak hour in all our experiments on the NYC taxi dataset.
11 Experiments - Extreme Case
To illustrate the effect of α and β on NAdap, consider the
extreme case when |U| = 1 (U = u0) and |V| = 3 and
V = v0, v1, v2 (i.e., there is only one driver in the system and
3 types of request come in during the pear hour). The arrival
rate (rv) for each request is 1, which gives T = 3. The edge
probabilities are as follows, pu0,v0 = 1 and pu0,vk = 0.25 for
k = 1, 2. For simplicity, let profit associated with each edge
(w f ) be 1. In this scenario, if one were to maximize profit
(via solving LP-(1)), a possible solution to x f (number of
probes to an edge) could be x0 = 1 and x1 = x2 = 0. In
such a case, fairness of the system would be zero (since re-
quests v1 and v2 would never be matched). However, if one
were to maximize fairness (via solving LP-(2)), then the so-
lution would ensure that all xi > 0. Recall that by definition
of fairness, LP-(2) would maximize the expected number of
probes for the v with minimum number of matched edges,
which would ensure that all types of requests are matched
over time. Hence this case gives us very different solutions
to LP-(1) (x∗) and LP-(2) (y∗). Thus, running NAdap with
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Figure 5: Extreme Case: comparison of performances of
NAdap against Greedy and Uniform. |U | = 1, |V | = T = 3
with p0 = 1 and p1, p2 = 0.25. All w f = 1 and rv = 1. ∆ = 2
(Top), and ∆ = 3 (Bottom).
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Figure 6: Distribution of requests by hour of the day aver-
aged over January.
different α and β values should result in different matchings
and thus different fairness and porfit values. The results are
discussed in the next section.
11.1 Results
It is important to note that we must set ∆ >= 2 else we
would be forcing the driver to accept the second ride and
the third ride would never get the chance to be matched to
a driver. From Figure 7, we can see the trend of decreasing
fairness with increasing α (since β controls fairness and as α
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Figure 7: Extreme Case: competitive ratios for profit and
fairness with different values of α and β with α + β = 1.
|U | = 1, |V | = T = 3 with p0 = 1 and p1, p2 = 0.25. All
w f = 1 and rv = 1. ∆ = 2 (Top), and ∆ = 3 (Bottom).
increases β decreases). Figure 5 compares NAdap to Greedy
and Uniform. In our setting all profits are equal (all w f =
1) hence the dots for Greedy and Uniform are very close
by. Greedy chooses the driver that is most likely to accept
the trip out of all available drivers and Uniform randomly
chooses a driver and then checks for availability. This is the
reason behind the slight difference in competetive ratios of
Uniform and Greedy. However, as is clear from Figure 5,
our proposed algorithm, for some choice of (α, β), performs
much better.
